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This study investigates the relationship between neighborhood transition and 
criminalization in Washington, D.C. census tracts. The main hypothesis predicts that 
racially diversified census tracts will experience increases in formal social control 
(a.k.a. criminalization) of minority and low-income groups due to social tension 
between race groups. Existing ethnographic literature links neighborhood levels of 
racial diversity to various forms of criminalization but quantitative literature on the 
topic is sparse. This study uses demographic census data and official stop-and-frisk 
data to examine how changes in neighborhood racial composition affect police stop-
and-frisk practices in Washington, D.C. The longitudinal nature of the data and the 
spatial methods employed build upon the existing body of quantitative criminalization 
research. Findings indicate that increases in racial diversity are associated with 
increases in the criminalization of black individuals, particularly in tracts that were 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Every year government bodies, the media, and other actors criminalize and 
decriminalize various behaviors in response to social concerns, current events, or 
other circumstances. During Maryland’s 2019 legislative session, the General 
Assembly introduced approximately 41 bills that would formally criminalize new acts 
if enacted and approximately nine bills that would formally decriminalize existing 
offenses. This process demonstrates criminalization, or the increased perception of 
criminality associated with specific social groups or behaviors, often accompanied by 
an increase in formal or informal social control. A well-known example of 
criminalization is the conflation of race and crime. Existing literature finds that 
perceptions of minority criminal behavior exceed their actual behavior (Quillian and 
Pager 2001, Quillian and Pager 2010, Sampson and Raudenbush 2005). The current 
study uses police stops to capture the criminalization of minorities in Washington 
D.C. neighborhoods. These police-citizen interactions serve as a proxy for current 
levels of criminalization as Broken Windows style policing encourages officers to 
enforce community preferences regarding minor behaviors as part of a broader 
strategy. Police stops will capture a shift in community preferences towards the 
criminalization of minorities, or behaviors associated with minorities. 
Community advocacy organizations raise awareness of the toll that 
criminalization takes on vulnerable populations. For example, in Washington, D.C. 
Councilmembers introduced the Amplified Noise Amendment Act of 2018, supported 
by the downtown business district lobby. This legislation would have created a 





not exceeding $300 (Frye, 2018). The District’s downtown business area is 
historically home to musical street performers who rely on the heavy foot traffic for 
income. The musical street performers are predominantly black while the downtown 
business district lobby is predominantly white. This legislation demonstrates conflict 
between social groups regarding community preferences, and the mobilization of 
police resources to criminalize the minority group.  
Criminalization is defined in this paper as the increased perception of 
criminality associated with specific social groups or behaviors, often accompanied by 
an increase in formal or informal social control (Kane et al. 2013). This could entail 
events at the city-level such as the noise amendment described above or events at the 
neighborhood-level, such as the eviction of a homeless encampment (Moreno, 2000; 
Rios, 2011). This paper argues that as neighborhoods racially diversify, social tension 
between members of different race groups will rise, resulting in the criminalization of 
minorities. The theoretical propositions set forth in Black’s Behavior of Law theory 
(1976) and Blalock’s theory of Minority-group Relations (1967) support this 
argument. Blalock argues that when a dominant group’s social position is threatened, 
the group will mobilize resources against the perceived threat. Black (1976) argues 
that the criminal justice system intervenes more heavily when the complainant 
belongs to the dominant group, and the offender to the oppressed group. Existing 
literature finds that social tensions, measured here using 311 calls, rise in racially 
diverse spaces due to conflicts that arise in public spaces. This paper argues that 
whites mobilize resources against a perceived minority threat in the form of police 





emergency hotline that residents can call to request city services like bulk collection 
or streetlight repair. 
Criminal justice practitioners must understand the various forms of 
criminalization affecting vulnerable populations. Literature documents the collateral 
consequences of criminal convictions and arrests on individuals (Pinard 2010, 
Petersilia 2000) but minor interactions such as stop and frisks also produce negative 
consequences (Lerman and Weaver 2014, Kutner 2015). As contemporary residential 
preferences increasingly favor racially diverse and often disinvested urban 
neighborhoods (Smith, 2014), urban planning agencies have the opportunity to ensure 
an equitable distribution of the benefits of this new trend. Existing research is mixed 
on this issue. One body of literature finds that neighborhood racial diversity is 
positively related to social tension (Legewie and Schaeffer, 2016; Vo, 2018). Brown-
Sacaino (2017) and Hyra and Prince (2015) document negative outcomes for minority 
individuals in racially diverse areas, such as feelings of alienation from developments 
that increasingly reflect white preferences. 
This paper investigates how changes in neighborhood racial diversity relate to 
criminal justice outcomes for vulnerable populations, specifically in the form of 
police stops. The main hypothesis predicts that increases in racial diversity are 
associated with increases in police stops of minorities. The second hypothesis predicts 
that this association will vary across neighborhoods with different racial compositions 
at the study’s baseline. The final hypothesis predicts that social tensions, measured as 
311 calls, mediate the relationship between racial diversity and police stops. Existing 





(Carmichael and Kent, 2014; Parker et al., 2005) but this paper  examines the 
dynamic over time at the neighborhood-level. This paper also extends research 
linking racial diversity to social tension by testing these social processes in relation to 
criminalization of minorities. 
The next section details the theoretical arguments of Black (1976) and Blalock 
(1967), followed by historical context of the study site, and existing empirical support 
for the hypotheses. The following section introduces the data, then describes variable 
measurements and the analytic strategy employed. The results are then presented, 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This section provides theoretical support for the main argument, a brief 
historical account of D.C.’s demographics and police-minority relations, and the 
existing empirical evidence of the relationship between racial diversity, social 
tension, and criminalization.  
Theoretical Motivation 
Black’s Behavior of Law theory and Blalock’s Minority Group Relations 
theory (Black, 1976; Blalock, 1967) generally argue that dominant or oppressive race 
and class groups leverage their resources to influence various institutions to act on 
their behalf. Black (1976) argues that the amount of criminal law applied in response 
to a criminal offense depends partly on the social classes of the involved parties. He 
argues that greater social distance is associated with greater use of law when the 
complainant belongs to the dominant social group. Applying this proposition to 
neighborhoods experiencing racial diversification, we expect indicators of law 
enforcement to increase as members of the dominant group increasingly interact with 
members of non-dominant groups. Ethnographic literature finds that interactions 
between members of different race and class groups in public space frequently result 
in perceived violations of the dominant group’s public space expectations (Chaskin 
and Joseph 2015). Black’s theory supports the assertion that criminal law applied on 
behalf of the dominant group will increase under these conditions. 
Behavior of law literature also argues that law enforcement agencies exercise 





number of criminal statutes and volume of criminal offenses exceed police capacity 
departments increasingly exercise this discretion (Beckett, 2006). This proposition 
supports the hypothesis that police stops of minority groups will increase in racially 
diversifying neighborhoods. Residents belonging to the dominant group will mobilize 
their resources to influence law enforcement to exercise discretion on behalf of the 
dominant group. For example, dominant group members may circulate a petition 
demanding that local park curfews be enforced. In this paper, I argue that law 
enforcement stops minority group members at greater rates when the area’s racial 
composition becomes more diverse. 
 Blalock’s theory of Minority Group Relations (1967) argues that dominant 
group members feel threatened when exposed to minority group power and react 
through aggressive or avoidance behavior. Avoidance behavior typically takes the 
form of restrictive policies, such as racially restrictive federal housing policies or 
local zoning ordinances (Blalock, 1967). A strong body of historical research 
documents the federal government’s support for racial segregation (Rothstein, 2018), 
and similar efforts by public and private institutions and individuals (Glantz and 
Martinez, 2018; Alpert, 2016). This research illustrates avoidance behavior but does 
not establish any associational or causal relationship with the relative size of racial 
groups in the local community.  
Aggressive behavior could take the form of criminalization or exploitation. 
Blalock states that minority group members who deviate from social norms are more 
susceptible to aggressive behavior because their actions make criminalization or 





directly supports the current study’s argument that social tensions rise between 
members of different social groups residing in a given area, often over perceived 
violations of public space behavior norms. These theories address the role of both 
government and non-government actors in the criminalization of minority.  
Blalock published his theory during a time when White Flight and block-
busting characterized the housing market. White Flight refers to the trend in which 
whites moved out of urban areas in droves in the late 20th century, and into 
surrounding largely white suburbs. The factors behind White Flight are numerous and 
include racism and rising urban crime (Rothstein 2017). Block-busting refers to the 
real estate practice of quickly turning over neighborhoods from white to Black 
homeowners. First, real estate agents induce fear in white home owners about the 
possibility of black neighbors. Then, agents buy homes and entire blocks at low 
prices as white homeowners flee perceived racial encroachment. These real estate 
agents are then free to sell homes to blacks at high prices, as many neighborhoods 
were still off limit to blacks due to racially restrictive covenants and deeds (Rothstein 
2017). 
Today, the housing market is characterized by gentrification more so than 
block-busting. This alters the context in which racial threat processes play out. As 
opposed to black individuals entering predominantly white neighborhoods, today we 
have white individuals entering predominantly black neighborhoods. While this 
characterizes most racially diversifying tracts in D.C., there are also historically white 
tracts that experienced minority in-migration, specifically in northwest D.C. This 





racial compositions influence racial threat dynamics? There is reason to believe that 
dominant group members in predominantly white neighborhoods react differently to 
minority in-migration compared to dominant group members moving into 
predominantly black neighborhoods.  Although the historical context shifted since the 
1960s, we expect Blalock’s propositions to hold. Several studies have tested 
Blalock’s propositions in relation to formal social control of minority groups. Their 
findings are discussed below in the Empirical Evidence section under the 
Criminalization heading. 
Historical context: neighborhood change and stop and frisks in D.C. 
During the 1980s, the District’s black population began to shrink after decades 
of continuous growth that had earned D.C. the nickname “Chocolate City” (Jaffe and 
Sherwood, 2015).  The overall population also declined, but the Hispanic/Latinx 
population grew, settling mainly in the northwest neighborhoods of Columbia 
Heights, Adams Morgan, and Mount Pleasant (Asch and Musgrove, 2017). Tensions 
rose between Hispanic/Latinx communities and law enforcement over the District’s 
deportation policy regarding South American immigrants (Kijakazi et al, 2016).  
In the mid-1980s, drug markets experienced an increase in violent crime 
prompting the new conservative Federal government to brand D.C. as the nation’s 
crime capital (Asch and Musgrove, 2017). The Metropolitan Police Department 
(MPD) introduced Operation Cleansweep during this decade, which dedicated 100-
200 officers a day to targeting drug dealers and violent crime. The controversial tactic 
known as “jump-out squads” came under intense public scrutiny in relation to this 





to five officers who patrol areas, jump out of the vehicle, and surround individuals 
perceived as suspicious. Officers often draw their guns and frisk individuals during 
these interactions. Witnesses report being surrounded and searched without hearing 
any identification or commands from officers, and numerous minority District 
residents claim police officers use this tactic to harass members of their community 
(Flatow, 2014).  
In the 1990s, the overall population continued to decline hitting its lowest 
point in recent history, 569,000, in 1999 (Kijakazi et al., 2016). The economy slowed 
nationwide in the early 1990s halting commercial and residential development in 
numerous cities including the District. According to the Brookings Institution (2016) 
however, the suburbs surrounding the District experienced dramatic population 
growth during this time. Counties like Fairfax, Montgomery, and Loudon were 
characterized by lower poverty rates and higher median incomes than Washington, 
D.C. Gillette (2015) illustrates the District’s economic state during this decade in 
stating that 64% of jobs within the larger metropolitan area were located outside of 
the District, and 60% of jobs within the District were held by non-residents.  
The District’s high crime rates persisted into the mid-1990s then declined 
alongside larger national trends according to the MPD’s 2001 annual report. During 
this decade, the Department struggled with staffing levels and other labor issues. In 
the late 1980s, a wave of police officers retired, and MPD subsequently lowered 
hiring standards under pressure to replace personnel (Jaffe and Sherwood, 2015). By 
1993, 113 of these new hires were indicted on criminal charges ranging from 





Musgrove, 2017). Multiple news outlets published articles in which District residents 
report harassment by law enforcement officers and general tension between 
communities and police. Cherkis (2000) wrote about the infamous 6th District “jump-
out boys”: four vice officers assigned to the 6th District who had a reputation among 
fellow officers for involvement in criminal activity and harassing minority residents. 
In the first decade of 2000, several factors contributed to dramatic population 
growth in the District, such as the growing local budget and a nationwide housing 
boom (Asch and Musgrove, 2017; Gandhi, Spaulding, McDonald, 2015). The federal 
government and lobbying and defense industries expanded post-911, drawing mostly 
white young professionals and greater wealth to the District (Asch and Musgrove, 
2017). Median home values in D.C. increased 75% between 2000 and 2010 and the 
number of affordable housing units dropped from 70,000 in 2000 to 34,500 in 2010 
(Kijakazi, 2016; Asch and Musgrove, 2017, Gillette, 2015; Gandhi, Spaulding, 
McDonald, 2015). These new residents settled in Petworth, Columbia Heights, and 
Shaw in the northwest, and Bloomingdale, LeDroit Park, and Eckington in the 
northeast. Some of these neighborhoods were also home to substantial Salvadorian 
and Caribbean communities at the time (Singer, 2003; Jaffe and Sherwood, 2015).  
In the 2000s, MPD continued struggling with community relations and media 
coverage. Accusations of racial profiling led to an investigative report of traffic and 
pedestrian stops. An independent consulting company selected 20 sites associated 
with high stop counts and evaluated the sites for pedestrian and vehicle traffic 
patterns. After accounting for the pedestrian and vehicle traffic of racial group across 





study found that Black and Hispanic/Latinx pedestrians were stopped at higher rates 
than their white counterparts in a site with racially diverse foot traffic, and that Blacks 
were stopped at aggressively higher rates at a site with predominantly white foot 
traffic (Lamberth, 2006). This supports the hypothesis that law enforcement will 
target minority group members, and that the degree of targeting severity relates to the 
racial composition of the area. However, these findings refer only to several specific 
locations within D.C. and use cross-sectional data that can’t examine how changes in 
racial diversity affect law enforcement practices. 
The D.C. local government suggested the use of law enforcement resources 
for furthering development in several neighborhoods during the 2000s. The Office of 
Planning (OP) spearheaded the revitalization of the Howard/Dunbar theater town 
center in the north-central Shaw neighborhood and the Lincoln theater common in the 
northwest U street neighborhood. The District subsidized the theaters’ financial 
operations and sold government-owned properties to commercial and residential 
developers, according to an OP project analysis (2004). The report states that “Future 
retail development of the 7th Street Corridor will depend on resolving the street’s 
safety and maintenance issues”. The report advocates for an aggressive campaign for 
both real and perceived safety and cleanliness, stating that “MPD has shown a 
willingness to work proactively in other areas” (Office of Planning, 2004). This 
indicates support of formal social control in response to factors that influence 
perceptions of fear, a broader array of factors than those codified in law as “criminal”. 
The District government supported demographic change and guided development 





Williams (1999 – 2007) openly encouraged government agencies to sell unused 
property to developers as part of an effort to build more housing and amenities for the 
middle-class (Asch and Musgrove, 2017; Gillette, 2015). Between 2000 and 2004, 
developers bought $40 million of government property in Navy Yard along the 
southwest Anacostia waterfront. This area was home to predominantly black 
working-class commercial establishments but evolved to suit D.C.’s growing mostly 
white middle-class over the next five years (Gandhi, Spaulding, McDonald, 2015).  
During the 2010s, the overall population continued to grow but at a slower 
rate than the previous decade. Census data show the that black population continued 
to decline and new residents continued settling in neighborhoods west of the 
Anacostia, avoiding areas along the District’s eastern border next to Prince George’s 
County (Hyra and Prince, 2015). By 2014, developers were in the process of 
constructing upscale commercial venues or luxury condominiums on every single 
block of 14th Street between Thomas Circle and Clifton Terrace (Gillette, 2015), an 
area that sat in rubble for decades. Development also spread further east into the 
historically black neighborhoods of Ivy City, Gallaudet, Trinidad, H Street, and 
Deanwood (Jaffe and Sherwood, 2015).  
In the early 2010s, high-profile police shootings and use-of-force incidents 
focused the national spotlight on police-community relations. Several advocacy 
organizations emerged in D.C. with the goal of ending police violence and increasing 
community control over policing (Kutner, 2015). These groups collaborated with the 
local chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union to gather arrest records and 





stop and frisks. According to the advocacy organizations, these anecdotes and arrest 
records indicate clear patterns of police harassment of minority communities 
(Sadanandan, 2013; Kutner, 2015). The media outlet ThinkProgress interviewed 
Police Chief Cathy Lanier regarding jump-outs and Chief Lanier called them a 
“fantasy” (Flatow, 2018). During a later public hearing on police oversight, Lanier 
reversed this statement saying that vice and gun squads use a tactic that sounds 
similar to what citizens describe as “jump-outs” (Kutner, 2015; Flatow, 2018). This 
back and forth between advocacy organizations and law enforcement supports the 
current study’s claim that formal social controls applied to vulnerable populations are 
motivated by factors other than criminal behavior. 
Empirical Evidence for Key Theoretical Constructs 
Neighborhood Transition 
This section summarizes research related to the interactions of racial groups in 
racially diversifying neighborhoods. Chaskin and Joseph (2015) studied three state-
sponsored mixed-income developments in Chicago using interviews, field 
observations, and documentary research. The authors find that higher-income and 
lower-income residents hold “competing expectations” over appropriate behaviors for 
public space that manifest as conversations about public safety. For example, the 
authors find that higher-income residents object to certain behavior such as hanging 
laundry in public, and barbequing or repairing cars in the street.  
Walker et al. (2018) studied Latinx neighborhood involvement levels in areas 





and newer often-white residents use neighborhood spaces for different types of 
activities. Latinx residents use yards, streets, parks, pools, churches, etc. as gathering 
spaces for celebrations and white residents use these spaces for more solitary 
activities such as biking, or dog-walking, and more formal activities such as social 
clubs and organized sports. The authors argue that different racial groups may have 
different frameworks for understanding engagement in community, use of public 
space, and common social interactions. These studies suggest that heterogeneous 
populations residing in the same geographic area will hold different community 
preferences and expectations. The current paper argues neighborhood racial diversity 
in particular leads to social tension and criminalization of minorities. 
In the Washington, D.C. Columbia Heights neighborhood, residents had a 
tradition of playing pick-up soccer at Harriet Tubman Elementary School fields on 
Sundays at 7pm (Chason 2017). Recently, an organized sports league filed a permit to 
claim the field at that time for their own use, creating controversy over use of this 
space. The pick-up games consisted predominantly of immigrant and Latino/Latino 
residents and the organized sports league consisted predominantly of white residents. 
Paul Butler (2017) argues that instances such as this demonstrate a wider pattern of 
incoming middle-class residents failing to assimilate to pre-existing neighborhood 
norms. This supports the study’s main prediction that an increase in neighborhood 
racial diversity may bring tension and conflict to social interactions. 
Social Tension 
Several articles utilize publicly-available 311 databases to measure social 





D.C. then summarizes the existing empirical research on social tension. Many 
municipalities receive city service requests from residents, such as requests for 
dangerous tree removals, through a centralized system often called 311. Individuals 
call this number or submit requests online and the appropriate city agency responds to 
the case. Some 311 calls are related to social interactions or tension, while other 
requests simply relate to basic city services. For example, requests related to parking 
enforcement or noise complaints indicate that the caller is upset with another 
individual’s behavior. Requests related to dangerous tree removal or overgrown 
public land are not related to interactions between neighborhood residents. The 
current study selected 311 requests related to social interactions to serve as a proxy 
for social tension. 
Legewie and Schaeffer (2016) predict that racially mixed areas located 
between homogenous communities will experience heightened social tension 
measured as 311 calls in their “contested boundaries” hypothesis. The authors found 
that among New York City census tracts, complaints of noise, public drinking, and 
other quality-of-life crimes were significantly more frequent in contested boundaries 
than homogenous areas. This study also demonstrates the importance of considering 
the larger demographic context when investigating complex social issues. “Contested 
boundaries” did not exist in a vacuum, but depended the characteristics of neighbors. 
This paper accounts for the larger demographic context by investigating the issue 
across different neighborhood types and including controls for spatial dependency. 
Vo (2018) studied the racial diversification of New York City neighborhoods and 





These findings support the prediction that conflict and social tensions will rise 
between racial groups that inhabit the same area. This paper argues that in reaction to 
this tension, dominant group members rely on mechanisms of formal control to 
support the social hierarchy.  
Criminalization 
The next few paragraphs provide a summary of research related to the concept 
criminalization. Alvare (2017) argues that prevalent criminal narratives tie innocuous 
behaviors associated with minorities to illegal activities, allowing law enforcement to 
target individuals based on race. Pattillo (2007) describes this process as 
“criminalization”. Quillian and Pager (2001) studied criminalization at the 
neighborhood-level in Chicago, Seattle, and Boston. The authors captured this 
concept by comparing perceptions of neighborhood criminality with neighborhood 
racial composition, controlling for crime rates and other relevant characteristics. The 
authors found that minority neighborhoods are perceived as higher crime areas, even 
after accounting for the neighborhood’s actual crime rate. This supports Alvare’s 
argument that perceptions of minority criminality exceed actual crime rates for these 
groups. This also supports the current study’s argument that dominant group members 
will perceive innocuous minority behavior as violations of various norms. 
Using qualitative methods, Patillo (2007) finds that new residents in 
gentrifying neighborhoods exert influence with civic leaders and local institutions to 
increase police patrols in neighborhoods, and as a result arrests increase for quality-
of-life offenses. At numerous Advisory Neighborhood Committee (ANC) meetings in 





and increased enforcement of quality-of-life offenses. This paper asserts that 
dominant group members direct formal social controls at minority groups, not in 
response to criminal activity, but in order to resolve social tensions. 
Carmichael and Kent (2014) examined the relationship between 
criminalization and inequality at the metropolitan-level, using police force size to 
measure criminalization. The authors hypothesized that when lower- and upper-
classes coexist, the upper class asserts social control through the criminal justice 
system, and predicted larger police forces in cities with greater inequality. Their study 
found a significant positive relationship between inequality and police force size 
which supports Black’s (1976) arguments that dominant group actors rely on law 
enforcement and formal control to assert their preferences. Kane et al. (2013) studied 
the relationship between quality-of-life misdemeanor arrests and the residential racial 
composition of Washington, D.C. census tracts. The authors found that an increase in 
black representation between 1990 and 2000 was associated with a higher level of 
black arrests in 2000, only in historically white census tracts. 
In urban affairs literature, Sharp (2013) introduced the postindustrial policing 
hypothesis which argues that as city economies become more tourism- and amenities-
based, local governments increase the policing of innocuous behaviors (curfew or 
loitering violations, disorderly conduct, truancy, etc.) amongst members of the 
working class in an effort to appease the bourgeoisie. Using cross-sectional crime 
data from large U.S. cities, Sharp found that postindustrial economies are 
significantly related to larger proportions of arrests being order-maintenance related. 





relationship between gentrification and stop and frisks in New York City census 
tracts. She used several different measures of gentrification, including percent change 
in the share of the population with bachelor’s degrees or postindustrial employment, 
and a categorical measure accounting for changes in rent and income from 2000 to 
2014. Laniyonu compared her gentrification measures to 2014 levels of stop and 
frisks, finding no gentrification effect in focal tracts, but a significant positive effect 
of adjacent tract gentrification. 
In summary, qualitative studies indicate that members of different racial 
groups may hold differing expectations of each other that clash during social 
interactions. A small body of quantitative research explores the extent to which the 
racial composition of a neighborhood relates to social tension, often measured using 
311 calls. The findings thus far support the prediction that higher levels of racial 
diversity are associated with higher levels of social tension.  These studies are cross-
sectional in nature however, and cannot address how social tensions respond to 
changes in racial diversity. Quantitative research also finds that dominant social 
groups rely on the criminal justice system to control minority behavior, but use cross-
sectional dependent variables. These studies examine how racial diversity and 









Chapter 3: Present Study and Hypotheses 
 
Using data compiled from various publicly-available government datasets, 
this paper explores how the social characteristics of neighborhood transitions relate to 
criminalization of minorities. This paper looks at demographic change that occurred 
in Washington, D.C. between the years 2011 and 2016. These changes are compared 
to changes in police stops, with variables lagged to 2012 and 2017 to establish 
temporal ordering.  
The current study builds on prior research in several ways. Longitudinal data 
for both the independent and dependent variables allow this study to examine how 
changes in these concepts relate to each other over time. Additionally, 311 call data 
test the argument that social tensions mediate the relationship between racial diversity 
and criminalization. Lastly, this study uses police stops to measure criminalization. In 
many urban jurisdictions, minority and low-income residents argue that police use 
this practice to harass them as individuals and communities (Cherkis, 2000; Flatow, 
2014; Sadanadan, 2013; Kutner, 2015). This controversy indicates that stops are a 
possible tool used by law enforcement to influence minority individuals.  
Existing literature and the propositions of racial threat and behavior of law 
indicate four hypotheses.   
Hypothesis 1. predicts that increases in racial diversity will be associated with 
increases in criminalization, generally.  
Hypothesis 1.b. predicts that increases in racial diversity will be associated 





Hypothesis 2. predicts that the relationship between racial diversity and 
criminalization will differ across census tracts depending on their baseline racial 
composition. Neighborhoods cycles through distinct phases in which their social and 
economic characteristics change. Scholars debate the catalyst for these cycles and 
often cite phenomena such as gentrification or immigration (Smith, 2014). It is 
possible that the nature of criminalization differs depending on the phenomena of 
change, for example gentrification versus immigrant-influx. Hypothesis two will test 
this possibility. Tracts that increased in racial diversity and were over 70% white in 
2011 are likely historically white neighborhoods that experienced immigrant in-
migration. The study site also contains tracts that were over 70% black in 2011, and 
experienced gentrification. The relationship of interest may differ significantly across 
different types of neighborhood transitions. 
Hypothesis 3. predicts that the relationship between racial diversity and 
criminalization will be partially mediated by social tension. 
To test these hypotheses, this paper conducts several tests to investigate any 
spatial dependencies in the data. After accounting for these dependencies, a series of 
fixed effects models estimate the relationship between racial diversity and police 
stops. Next, the role of 311 calls in this relationship is tested. Lastly, this paper 
explores how findings vary for black, white, and Latinx subgroups, and across 







Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
 
This section presents the benefits of the case-study approach, then describes 
the data sources utilized for analysis. The variable measurements and analytic 
strategy follow. 
Study Site 
This study focuses on Washington, D.C. as a study site in order to capture the 
complex concepts and relationships involved in the main hypothesis. A site’s initial 
racial composition and history of race relations may influence how increasing 
neighborhood racial diversity relates to criminalization (Brown-Saracino, 2017; 
Hwang, 2015). Additionally, police departments in different cities develop unique 
characteristics, such as reporting practices and relationships with minority 
communities. Using the same outcome measure across sites could produce 
measurement error in multi-site studies.  
Washington, D.C. offers several strengths as a study site, including 
quantitative and qualitative evidence that neighborhood transition occurred over the 
study’s timeframe. The District experienced dramatic demographic and economic 
change between 1970 and 2010 that is well-documented by census data, residents, 
community groups, local government agencies, media outlets, and research 
organizations. These changes are widely depicted as waves of young white 
professionals settling in predominantly black low-income neighborhoods (Asch and 





The District also serves as an ideal study site because numerous sources 
document growing social tension and criminalization in transitioning DC 
neighborhoods. The Atlantic documents a particular incident that occurred during the 
late 1990s in Northwest D.C.’s Malcolm X/Meridian Hill Park (even the name is a 
source of social tension as residents argue over which to use). New neighborhood 
residents clashed with a predominantly black drum circle that had played in the park 
for decades. The new residents circulated a petition that resulted in the enforcement 
of park curfew (Fayyad, 2017). This is an example of social tensions leading to the 
“criminalization” of behaviors associated with minorities. The Washington City Paper 
analyzed neighborhood list serves in gentrifying neighborhoods and found numerous 
complaints of “low-income eyesores” and “criminally-minded black youth” (Cherkis, 
2005), demonstrating the presence of income- and race-based negative perceptions in 
diversifying D.C. neighborhoods. 
Data 
This project uses two publicly available databases of police reports to measure 
levels of criminalization in Washington D.C. census tracts in 2012 and 2017. These 
databases are maintained by MPD for administrative purposes and became publicly 
available in 2016 due to public pressure (Nadeau, 2019). The term stop and frisks 
generally refers to incidents in which police officers stop individuals and search their 
persons for weapons. MPD officers complete different reports depending on whether 
or not the stop featured a frisk. Stops featuring frisks are more invasive but the 
concept of criminalization includes any increase in social control of the target 





Officers complete the appropriate report (stop and frisk or field contact event) for 
whichever interaction occurred and enter it into the appropriate database according to 
official department policy found in MPD General Order OPS-304.10. MPD limited 
the released stop data to exclude police stops that led to further enforcement actions 
such as arrest (Madden, 2018). This limitation is not ideal, but should operate in favor 
of the hypotheses. The discretion involved in police stops allows officers to use this 
tool to address innocuous behavior, or other behavior that is against middle-class 
norms but non-criminal. Stops that lead to further enforcement action, such as citation 
or arrest, likely involve low discretion. This paper is interested in police stops related 
to innocuous behavior, whereas stops that lead to further enforcement action are 
likely related to criminal behavior. 
Social tensions are measured in 2011 and 2016 using 311 calls. All call data 
are available on the District’s open data portal, including the callers request, caller 
comments, and geographic coordinates. In Washington, D.C., MPD does not respond 
to 311 calls, according to interviews with MPD officials. If callers mistakenly report a 
crime to 311, the callers are transferred to 911 services.  
The racial diversity independent variable is constructed using the Census 
Bureau’s American Community Survey 2011 and 2016 data. The Census also 
provided data for many of this study’s control variables. Several control variables are 
measured using additional datasets found on D.C.’s open data portal, including Metro 





Dependent variable: police stops 
Police stops capture the concept of criminalization due to the nature of 
behaviors that trigger social tension in racially diversifying neighborhoods. These 
conflicts generally involve quality-of-life issues that may not be eligible for arrest, so 
law enforcement utilizes alternative tools to assert community preferences, such as 
stop and frisks (Kane, 2013; Ousey & Lee, 2008; Rosenfeld, Fornango, & Rengifo, 
2007). These police-citizen interactions serve as a proxy for current levels of 
criminalization as Broken Windows style policing encourages officers to enforce 
community preferences regarding minor behaviors, as part of a broader strategy. 
Police stops will capture a shift in community preferences towards the criminalization 
of behaviors associated with minorities, particularly those behaviors implicated by 
social tensions. This paper argues that law enforcement will play this role in racially 
diversifying communities based on the propositions of Black and Blalock stating the 
criminal justice system’s complicity in maintaining the dominant group’s social 
status. 
Stop and frisks allow officers to detain individuals without probable cause, if 
specific and articulable facts lead the officer to suspect criminal activity. 1 Officers 
may question the individual, and in some circumstances search the individual’s outer 
clothing for weapons. Additional precedent-setting cases allow officers to seize illicit 
items detected during the search and arrest individuals found in possession.2 MPD 
uses the term “field contact event” to refer to less invasive interactions that occur 
 
1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
2 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Minnesota 





when an officer lacks articulable facts but believes circumstances warrant some 
investigative inquiry. Both types of stops are recorded as event-level data with 
demographic information, in which each observation represents one incident of an 
officer stopping an individual. These events were aggregated to census tract-level 
2012 and 2017 counts. Some police stop reports featured insufficient or missing 
address information. These stops are excluded and compose 4% of all police stops. 
On average, there were 25 stops per census tract per year, ranging from 0 to 224 for 
178 census tracts3.  
Independent variable: racial diversity 
This paper uses the Simpson Diversity Index (SDI) to measure changes in 
racial diversity. The Simpson Diversity Index (Hwang and Sampson 2014; Guajardo, 
2016) represents the probability that two individuals drawn at random from a 
population will be different races. This index captures census-tract levels of racial 
diversity, with higher values indicating greater diversity. Equation (1) presents the 
SDI formula used to calculate racial diversity: 
Pr(𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑐𝑒) = 1 − ∑ 𝑝𝑖
2𝑅
𝑖=1    (1) 
The current study calculated the 2011 and 2016 SDI scores using the following racial 
groups: black, white, Hispanic/Latinx, Asian, and other. Using 2011 and 2016 
measures of racial diversity imposes temporal ordering on the relationship between 
 
3 Tract 6202 was dropped from the study. This tract is composed entirely geographical anomalies 
such as the National Mall, the Potomac River, Potomac Park, and a major section of Interstate 395, 
and is not eligible to experience the social processes involved in this study’s arguments (Hwang and 
Sampson, 2014; Timberlake and Johns-Wolfe, 2017; Boggess and Hipp, 2006; Kane et al. 2013). This 





this variable and criminalization (which is measured in 2012 and 2017). This 
temporal lag ensures against including police stops that occurred prior to measured 
levels of racial diversity. On average, the probability that two individuals drawn at 
random from a census tract are from different races is .37, ranging from 0 to .72.  
Mediating variable: social tension 
The current study uses 311 call types related to social interactions or resident 
behavior to measure the concept of social tension. The information contained in the 
311 event-level data illustrate through comments left by callers that residents utilize 
city services to resolve social tension. For example, one caller reporting parking 
violations commented: “A red Cadillac with no tags illegally parked on street, please 
ticket and have towed.” Call types such as parking violations are included as the 
comments demonstrate social tension motivations, while calls requesting Christmas 
tree removal or dead animal pickup are not included. Several peer-reviewed articles 
and news media pieces demonstrate the utility of 311 calls differentiated by type (Vo, 
2018; Legewie and Schaeffer, 2016; Wheeler, 2017). Table 1. reports the top ten most 
frequent call types and their classifications. There are 173 call types in total and 35 
were classified as social tension-related. Appendix A contains the full table of call 
types and classifications. Calls generally fell into four modal categories, social 
tension, physical repair, administrative, and basic services. Physical repair refers to 
requests to fill potholes, repair streetlights, etc. Essentially, any 311 calls related to 
physical infrastructure as opposed to social processes. Basic services refers to yard 
waste removal, garbage and recycling collections, etc. Essentially, any 311 calls 





The administrative category contains 311 calls originated by employees of the call 
center. Again, 311 calls related to physical repair, basic services, or administration 
were excluded from the current analysis, which focuses on calls related to social 
tension. On average, there were 746 social tension calls per census tract, ranging from 
29 to 2,994.  
Moderating variables: baseline racial composition 
 Previous studies find that the effect of neighborhood change on various 
criminal justice outcomes varies depending on historical demographic characteristics 
of the neighborhood (Kane et al. 2013; MacDonald et al. 2013). This study created 
three binary variables indicating the racial majority of the census tract at the 
beginning of the study period. There were 80 tracts in the sample that were over 70% 
black in 2011, 35 tracts that were over 70% white, and 63 tracts in which no race 
group composed 70% or more of the population. 
    [INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Control variables 
This study includes as control variables tract-level population density, volume 
of metro riders, index crime rate, unemployment, and proportion of the population 
between 18 and 24. These controls capture the routine activities of a census tract, 
which influence police activities as well as the tract’s likelihood of experiencing 
demographic change (Saiz and Watcher, 2011). Census tracts vary in population and 
size, with denser tracts more likely to experience greater police scrutiny and more 
likely to attract development (Kane, 2017). The residential population per square foot, 





control for residential population density and pedestrian traffic patterns (Liu and 
Griswold, 2019). The index crime rates account for differential police resource 
allocation in response to crime patterns.  
Methods 
This paper analyses the relationship between neighborhood transition and 
police stops in Washington, D.C. census tracts in a series of negative binomial fixed 
effects models. The dependent variable police stops is a skewed non-negative rare 
event which violates the Ordinary Least Squares normality assumption, justifying the 
use of a count distribution, such as the Poisson or Negative Binomial. Guimaraes 
(2008) and Allison and Waterman (2002) demonstrate that the traditional negative 
binomial fixed effects model fails to truly control for all time stable unobserved unit 
characteristics. These articles provide two alternative options, which are used here. 
First, the unconditional negative binomial regression model with binary variables for 
each census tract and year controlling for fixed effects. Second, as a robustness check, 
the conditional Poisson fixed effects model with standard errors inflated by the 
dispersion parameter. Additionally, the key variables may autocorrelate based on the 
spatial proximity of the tracts, violating the OLS assumption of independent error 
terms. 
The analysis begins by addressing spatial dependency in the data. According 
to Arbia (2014), a study’s topic and design generally indicate the type of spatial 
correlation present in the data. For example, social interactions often demonstrate a 
“diffusion” or “contagion” effect while the use of administrative boundaries often 





boundaries. Different types of spatial dependency are best represented by different 
types of spatial weights matrices. The more accurately spatial relationships are 
represented in matrix form, the more spatial dependency is accounted for in the model 
(Tita and Radil, 2011). If the study’s topic suggests several possible matrix 
specifications, diagnostic tests can help distinguish the best option (Anselin, 1988). 
This paper’s topic leads to two competing matrix specifications. Many crime-
related research topics select a distance-between-centroids matrix, which are 
appropriate for “contagion”-type variables. Distance-based matrices often consider all 
units as neighbors, with their influence on each other weighted by the inverse-
distance between unit centroids. “Contagion” variables are those for which the focal 
tract value directly affects values in neighboring tracts. For example, homicide in one 
tract can prompt retaliatory homicide in another tract (Boggess and Hipp, 2006). 
Alternatively, there could be indirect spatial dependencies. This often occurs when 
unit boundaries fail to reflect true neighborhood boundaries (Coulton et al., 2001). In 
other words, the independent variables in neighboring units could affect outcomes in 
focal units if the underlying data generating process treats these units as part of the 
same neighborhood. This would suggest the use of a queen contiguity matrix to 
capture the influence of racial diversity in neighbor tracts on police stops in the focal 
tract. A queen contiguity matrix considers units to be neighbors if they share a 
common boundary or corner. Due to these competing justifications, this study 
considers both an inverse-distance matrix and a first-order queen contiguity matrix, 





Using these matrices, this paper created a spatial lag of the racial diversity 
variable. This paper then ran baseline models regressing police stops on racial 
diversity and the control variables. The residuals from this baseline model were also 
spatially lagged. The racial diversity spatial lag is essentially the weighted average of 
the racial diversity of neighbor tracts. This lag will account for the influence of racial 
diversity in adjacent tracts on police stops in the focal tract, net of all possible 
covariates (Arbia, 2014). Traditional spatial methods use a Spatial Durbin Model in 
the presence of this type of dependency, but researchers also include spatial lags of 
independent variables in non-spatial models (Kane et al., 2013; Lyons, 2008). The 
Spatial Error Model (SEM) SEM is appropriate when units of analysis suffer from 
unobserved heterogeneity that produces spatial correlation in of the error terms, 
(Arbia, 2014). Unobserved spatial heterogeneity often reflects the failure of the units 
of analysis to reflect the true boundaries of the underlying data generating process. 
Unfortunately, the SEM does not allow for non-normal distributions so this study 
includes a spatial lag of model residuals for each unique model specification. 
After creating the spatial lag variables, the analysis ran three negative binomial 
fixed effects regressions, each with a unique specification to control for spatial 
dependency. Moran’s I tests of the residuals from these three models, in addition to 
model fit statistics, indicated the model that best accounted for spatial dependencies 
in the data. The Moran’s I statistic indicates the degree of autocorrelation in a 
variable, weighted by the spatial distance between units.  
Next, the analysis explored whether the relationship between racial diversity and 





or not these predicted relationships differ depending on the baseline racial 
composition of the tract. This portion of the analysis uses interactions between the 
main racial diversity variable and the binary baseline racial composition variables, 
using neighborhoods in which no race group exceeded 70 percent of the tract 
population as the reference category.  
Next, the analysis examined how 311 calls mediate the relationship between racial 
diversity and police stops. The mediating role of 311 calls, or social tension, is 
allowed to differ across neighborhood types, and across the race of police stop 
subjects. This paper added the 311 variable to models regressing police stops on 
racial diversity and control variables, with interactions for neighborhood types, to test 
if social tension mediates the relationship between racial diversity and 
criminalization. It is possible that any change to the racial diversity coefficient from 
models in table 6. indicate a mediating role of 311 calls. Social tension is 
hypothesized to increase criminalization, so the racial diversity coefficient is expected 
to decrease upon the addition of the 311 calls variable. Lastly, all models used tract-











Chapter 5:  Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics for key variables pooled across all years. 
These figures demonstrate that police primarily stopped black individuals across 2012 
and 2017. Census tracts experienced on average  about 24 stops of blacks and only 
about 6 stops of whites, Hispanic/Latinx, or other individuals combined. For racial 
diversity, there was about a 37% likelihood of drawing two individuals of different 
race at random from a tract’s population. However, no tract exceeded a 71% 
likelihood in either 2011 or 2016.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
The pooled descriptive statistics mask important changes that occurred 
between 2011/2012 and 2016/2017. During 2012, MPD reports stopping 3,613 
people, or 6 per 1,000. This increased to 7,122 people in 2017, or a rate of 10 per 
1,000. The racial composition of police stops decreased slightly for blacks from 85% 
to 83%, but increased for Hispanic/Latinxs and whites. About 4.5% of people stopped 
in 2012 were Hispanic/Latinx, increasing to 7.1% in 2017. The proportion of white 
people stopped was also about 4.5% in 2012 and increased to 10.2% in 2017. In 2012, 
whites composed 39.5% of the general population, blacks 51.1%, and 
Hispanic/Latinx 9.3% (American Community Survey). The white and 
Hispanic/Latinx population increased slightly by 2017 to 40.7% and 10.7% 
respectively. The black population decreased to 47.7% of the general population. 
On the neighborhood level, DC census tracts experienced an average of 20 





experienced zero stops during 2016. All but one of these tracts were located west of 
Rock Creek Park, a historically white area of the District. The northeast neighborhood 
Brentwood experienced 275 stops in 2016, the maximum out of the study period. 
Brentwood also experienced the largest increase in police stops, growing by 212 stops 
between 2017 and 2012. Figure 2 maps changes in police stops by tract, and indicates 
a small cluster around Brentwood that experienced large increases. In 2011, 
Brentwood was 97% black, 2% white, and 1% Hispanic/Latinx. By 2017, the black 
population decreased to 85%, while whites increased to 9% and Hispanic/Latinx 
increased to 4%. A census tract in the Shaw neighborhood experienced the largest 
decrease in police stops, declining from 174 in 2012 to 135 in 2017 (still over six 
times the district-wide average). In 2011, this tract was 30% black, 53% white, and 
12% Hispanic/Latinx. By 2017, the black and Hispanic/Latinx population decreased 
to 17% and 6% respectively, while whites increased to 68%. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
Spatial Dependency 
This study created two spatial weights matrices to represent the spatial 
relationships between D.C. census tracts. Moran’s I tests for spatial dependency 
consistently detected a greater amount of spatial dependency among key variables 
when using the queen contiguity matrix compared to the inverse-distance matrix. This 
indicates the queen contiguity matrix is preferable. It is possible that the inverse-
distance matrix underestimates spatial dependency due to considering all tracts 
neighbors, even those separated by great distance and dissimilarities. In addition to 





study’s topic. It’s likely that census tract demographic characteristics are influenced 
by the demographics of neighboring tracts, but not necessarily those in distant parts of 
the city. The remainder of the analysis utilized spatial lags created with the queen 
contiguity matrix.  
 Spatial Lag Models 
Table 3 compares the results of models that use different approaches to 
account for spatial dependency in the data. Model one includes the racial diversity 
lag, model two includes the residual lag, and model three includes both the racial 
diversity and residual lag. The racial diversity coefficient remained significant 
regardless of the spatial lag combination. The residual lag coefficient was significant 
in all models while the racial diversity lag was not significant in any model. This is 
surprising as the literature generally finds that the characteristics of neighboring 
communities or census tracts exert an influence on crime-related outcomes in the 
focal area (Boggess and Hipp 2014). One possible explanation for this study’s finding 
relates to the nature of the influence from nearby tracts. The racial diversity spatial 
lag is intended to capture the direct effect of racial composition in a neighbor tract on 
police stops in the focal tract. It could be that this relationship is more indirect. For 
example, the racial diversity of nearby tracts may be relevant because these areas are 
actually part of the same neighborhood that is misrepresented by census tract 
boundaries. If this is the case, these spatial dependencies are accounted for by the 
residual spatial lag. The residual lag model finds a significant positive relationship 
between racial diversity and police stops, indicating support for hypothesis one. 





words, the likelihood that two residents, drawn at random, are from different race 
groups) for a tract to experience an additional stop per year. Business activity and 
population density were also significant predictors, but to a smaller magnitude. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
 
Black Stops, White Stops, Hispanic Stops 
Table 4 displays results from models that limit the dependent variable first to 
blacks only, then to whites only. Models that limited the dependent variable to 
Hispanic/Latinx stops only did not converge, so descriptive statistics are provided in 
Table 5. The results in Table 4 indicate that increases in racial diversity are 
significantly related to increases in police stops for blacks only. The coefficient 
suggests that if racial diversity increases by 2 percent on the SDI, the tract will 
experience an additional stop per year. For white stops, the racial diversity coefficient 
is negative and not significant. In the white stops model, none of the predictors 
achieve significance, except for metro ridership which is marginally significant. 
These findings support hypothesis 1.b., which predicted that increases in racial 
diversity will be associated specifically with the criminalization of minorities. For 
Hispanic/Latinx stops, detailed descriptive statistics for police stops and are displayed 
in Table 5. While this information doesn’t reveal anything about statistical 
significance, it is still important. It appears that Hispanic/Latinx stops experienced 
minimal amounts of change during the study’s time period. The median change 
across different neighborhood types is generally zero, and the mean between 0 and 1. 






[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
Baseline Racial Composition 
Table 6 contains the results from models that allow the relationship between 
changes in racial diversity and police stops to vary depending on the racial 
composition of the tract in 2011. Kane et al. (2013) find that the baseline racial 
composition of a census tract moderates the relationship between racial encroachment 
and misdemeanor arrests. The relationship between racial diversity and police stops is 
allowed to vary by interacting the racial diversity variable with each of the three 
binary indicators of baseline racial composition, using tracts in which no race group 
exceeded 70 percent as the reference group. The first column reports findings from a 
model regressing all stops on predictors, the second column from a model regressing 
black stops, and the third column from a model regressing white stops. Again, 
Hispanic/Latinx stops did not converge so descriptive statistics are reported in Table 
5. 
The results provide support for hypothesis two; the relationship between racial 
diversity and criminalization differs across neighborhood types. Criminalization 
responses likely differ depending on the characteristics of the local dominant and 
minority group that pre-date neighborhood transition. Whites defending historically 
white tracts may behave differently than whites who are gentrifying historically black 
tracts. Additionally, minorities migrating into historically white tracts may be 
criminalized differently than minorities residing in gentrifying tracts. Results from the 





stops in baseline white tracts compared to tracts that were racially mixed at baseline. 
In tracts that were baseline Black, the association between racial diversity and police 
stops is significant and negative compared to baseline mixed tracts. Altogether, the 
models in Table 6 indicate that increases in racial diversity are only associated with 
increases in police stops if tracts were over 70 percent white in 2011. Figure 3 
displays the predictive margins of racial diversity across the three neighborhood 
types. The predicted counts of police stops are relatively stable across different levels 
of racial diversity in baseline Black and baseline mixed tracts. In baseline white tracts 
however, the predicted counts clearly increase with racial diversity. 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE] 
Column two contains results from a model that limited the dependent variable 
to black stops only. Similar to the findings for all police stops, this model indicates 
that changes in racial diversity did not significantly influence police stops in tracts 
that were racially mixed in 2011. Compared to these however, tracts that were over 
70 percent Black in 2011 demonstrated a strong positive association between changes 
in racial diversity and police stops. This suggests an increase in the criminalization of 
Blacks in gentrifying tracts. Results also differed from the All Stops model in tracts 
that were over 70 percent white in 2011. Compared to the reference category, these 
tracts experienced a significant and negative relationship between racial diversity and 
police stops. In the All Stops model however, this relationship was positive. It’s 
possible that white or Hispanic stops were driving the direction of the coefficient in 
the All Stops model. The results for baseline white tracts also contradict hypothesis 





based on officer perceptions of “belonging.” In this scenario, minorities will be 
criminalized to a greater extent if officers perceive them as “out of place” in a certain 
neighborhood. When historically white tracts diversify, more race groups naturally 
appear to belong. Figure 4 displays the predictive margins of racial diversity across 
the three neighborhood types. It’s clear from this graph that the positive relationship 
between racial diversity and police stops is strongest in baseline Black tracts. The line 
for baseline Black tracts slopes upward sharply, while the other neighborhood types 
decline or remain stable. 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE] 
 Column three contains results from a model that limited the dependent 
variable to white stops only. The relationship between racial diversity and police 
stops of whites was not significant in any of the neighborhood types. This provides 
additional support for hypothesis 1.b. Figure 5 displays the predictive margins of 
racial diversity across the three neighborhood types. This graph makes clear the lack 
of relationship between racial diversity and police stops of whites. The predictive 
margins are relatively stable and similar to each other across neighborhood types. 
 [INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE] 
Mediating Analysis 
In Table 7, 311 calls are added to the analysis as a mediating variable. This 
study argues that neighborhood racial diversity relates to the criminalization of 
minorities, partly due to social tension between race groups. The 311 call variable is a 





mediating role in the criminalization of Blacks. The 311 coefficient is small in 
magnitude in all models and is significant only when modeling Black police stops. In 
the Black Stops model, the racial diversity coefficient switches from significant to 
marginally significant. Additionally, the racial diversity coefficient decreases very 
slightly in magnitude (from 0.743 to 0.702) compared to the Black Stops model 
excluding the 311 call variable, but this difference is not significant. This provides 
partial support for hypothesis three. Additionally, the significance of the 311 
coefficient in the Black Stops model indicates that increases in social tension are 
associated with increases in the criminalization of blacks, net of changes in racial 
diversity and other covariates. Future research should explore this potential additive 
effect. 
The overall lack of support for the mediating role of social tension leaves us 
wondering what mechanism links changes in racial diversity to changes in police 
stops in tracts other than baseline Black tracts. It is possible that residents 
communicate social tension to law enforcement and government actors through 
alternative means, like neighborhood association meetings. It is also possible that law 
enforcement and government actors proactively address social tension without ques 
from neighborhood residents. The Office of Planning report mentioned on page 11 
advocates for an aggressive campaign against both real and perceived threats to safety 
and cleanliness, stating that “MPD has shown a willingness to work proactively in 
other areas” (Office of Planning, 2004). By emphasizing threats to perceived safety, 
this report indicates government support of formal social control of a broader array of 





required to understand the role of the local government in guiding police enforcement 
strategies. The implications of these finding are discussed in the conclusions below. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
Robustness Checks 
This paper employs negative binomial fixed effects models. Allison and 
Waterman (2002) and Guimaraes (2008) demonstrate that the conditional negative 
binomial fixed effects model is not a true fixed effects model. To address the 
concerns of these authors, this paper re-ran all models using Poisson fixed effects and 
standard errors inflated by the dispersion parameter. Using this method, only the 
coefficients related to black stops remained significant. These are the primary 
coefficients of interest for this paper. Their stable significance across methods lends 
support for their validity. This paper also employed different specifications of 
neighborhood type to ensure findings were not contingent on the arbitrary 70 percent 
threshold. Using a 65 percent threshold produced slightly different coefficient 
magnitudes, but significance levels remained stable. Lastly, this paper also modeled 
each neighborhood type separately. One could argue that the style of policing used in 
historically black tracts differs systematically from the style of policing used in 
historically white tracts. This would suggest modeling the relationship of interest 
separately for each neighborhood type. This produced a similar pattern to the 
robustness checks above. Coefficient magnitudes changed slightly, but none remained 
significant. The loss of significance is likely related to the small samples created by 





pattern of results indicates we can interpret the coefficients related to black stops, but 






Chapter 6:  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This study investigated the relationship between changes in racial diversity 
and the criminalization of minorities. Existing research suggests that racial diversity 
relates to levels of social tension in a neighborhood (Walker et al. 2018; Chaskin and 
Joseph, 2015). Studies also suggest that law enforcement actions against minorities 
change in relation to a neighborhood’s racial composition (Kane et al. 2013; 
Lamberth, 2006). This study attempted to link changes in racial diversity to changes 
in police stops of black individuals through social tension, finding partial support. 
Hypothesis 1 and 1.b. predicted that increases in racial diversity will be 
associated with greater criminalization, particularly of minorities. Table 4 provides 
strong evidence in support of this hypothesis. The relationship between racial 
diversity and black stops is positive and highly significant, but for white stops the 
coefficient is negative and null. Unfortunately, this paper cannot speak to the 
criminalization of Hispanic/Latinx persons. Less than 7 percent of incidents in the 
police stop data involved Hispanic/Latinx subjects, making it difficult to parse out 
any relationships. The descriptive statistics in Table 5 also indicate very little change 
occurred in Hispanic/Latinx stops at the tract-level. Tracts experienced, on average, 
an increase of two Hispanic/Latinx stops between 2017 and 2012, with a median of 
zero. 
Hypothesis two predicted that the relationship between racial diversity and 
criminalization will differ across census tracts depending on their baseline racial 
composition. Table 7 provides support for this prediction across black and white 





stops are not entirely trustworthy. Looking only at black stops, we still find support 
for hypothesis two. Increases in racial diversity appear to result in criminalization of 
blacks, only in tracts that were over 70 percent black in 2011. Thus, minorities 
residing in gentrifying neighborhoods may be at greater risk than minorities residing 
in, or migrating to predominantly white neighborhoods. 
Hypothesis one predicted that increases in racial diversity will be associated 
with increases in criminalization, generally. Results in Table 5 provide evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. If tract-level racial diversity increases by 3.5 percent on 
the SDI, it will experience an additional stop per year, on average. Hypothesis three 
predicted that the relationship between racial diversity and criminalization will be 
partially mediated by social tension. Results in Table 4 fail to find evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. There are several possible explanations. First, 311 calls 
used to measure social tension in this study may be a poor indicator. These 
government hotlines differ between municipalities. Prior studies, such as Legewie and 
Schaeffer (2016), used New York City 311 calls. These data feature calls related to 
noise complaints, public drinking, and blocking a driveway. Washington, D.C. 311 
calls do not feature complaints related to these issues, which are instead handled by 
other agencies. Another explanation is that changes in racial diversity relate to 
criminalization through some mechanism other than social tension. One possibility is 
local government intervention. Take for example the role of the Office of Planning 
(OP) in the policing of the 7th Street Corridor (also referenced on page 11). The (OP) 
advocated for aggressive policing against both real and perceived threats to safety and 





areas” (Office of Planning, 2004). Future research on this topic should attempt to 
explore social tension, local government intervention, and additional mechanisms. It’s 
possible that numerous structural and neighborhood factors mediate the relationship 
between racial diversity and criminalization. 
These findings have important implications for urban planning agencies and 
law enforcement departments. Anecdotal accounts of police stops or jump outs claim 
officers use this tactic in combination with unjustified racial profiling. This paper 
presents preliminary support for such claims, as blacks were stopped with increasing 
frequency after controlling for crime and other variables related to policing. 
According to Kutner (2015) and Rios (2017), the subjects of police stops experience 
negative outcomes such as fear and alienation (Kutner, 2015; Rios, 2017). According 
to Lerman and Weaver (2014), neighborhoods that experience heightened levels of 
stop and frisks exhibit lower levels of civic engagement. Existing literature also 
questions the legitimacy of using law enforcement to exert formal control over non-
criminal behavior (Vitale, 2017).. Heightened fear and decreased community 
engagement could in turn generate higher crime rates. When criminalization increases 
due to growth in racial diversity, minority residents may additionally lose trust in law 
enforcement. At a time when police-community relations are generally tense, law 
enforcement needs to consider how various strategies affect community trust.  
There are several potential solutions. First, law enforcement agencies could 
establish stop and frisk criteria that reduce the use of racial profiling in stop and frisk 
strategies. For example, law enforcement policies could prohibit stops motivated by 





Court precedent. Numerous studies document the increased likelihood of minorities 
to live in neighborhoods with crime rates higher in relation to predominantly white 
neighborhoods. This simple change could reduce the increased exposure of minorities 
to police surveillance, independent of their actual behavior. Additionally, 
neighborhood associations could become more involved in ensuring equitable 
transitions. These associations could host events at which residents may discuss 
public space norms and grievance procedures for perceived violations. For example, 
neighborhood residents may benefit from mediation services offered by several 
organizations in the D.C. area. During mediation sessions, residents can resolve social 
tension without involving the criminal justice system. 
Limitations 
These findings may not generalize directly to municipal areas other than D.C., 
because this paper constructed variables with the District’s context specifically in 
mind. The study site differs from alternative locations on important characteristics 
like the police per capita ratio and unique government structure. Future research 
should explore these dynamics in different settings. Washington, D.C. experienced an 
influx of white residents during the study’s time period, but these propositions must 
be tested in areas that feature multiple transition trajectories in order to hold. 
This study uses police stops in 2012 and 2017, however several incidents 
occurred during this period that may influence data collection practices. Advocacy 
organizations in the District supported the successful passage of a crime prevention 
bill that shifts resources away from traditional policing and towards preventative 





Act, mandates the MPD to collect more detailed data on stop-and-frisk incidents and 
to release said data to the public (Cohen, 2017). The Act passed the DC Council in 
2016 and within a year most provisions were funded by the mayor’s office. This 
increased public scrutiny surrounding stop and frisks may affect officer behavior. 
However, these changes occurred across the whole District and may not interfere with 
detecting a relationship between neighborhood change and criminalization within 
tracts. 
Several changes also occurred to MPD personnel and organization during this 
study’s timeframe which are relevant to the topics of interest. First, Police Chief 
Cathy Lanier re-organized the vice and guns squads by eliminating precinct-based 
units and centralizing them in the MPD’s headquarters. Lanier claimed that 
productivity of these squads declined over recent years as illicit organizations adopted 
new strategies (Jaffe, 2015). Vice and gun squads engage in a greater proportion of 
proactive policing than other police units so this re-organization may affect stop-and-
frisk rates. Again, these changes occurred across the whole District and thus may not 









Table 1. Call Types and Classifications 
    
Call type Frequency Percent Classification 
Parking Enforcement 55,631 17.66 Social Tension 
Disorder Complaints 26,415 8.42 Social Tension 
Abandoned Vehicle 6,481 2.07 Social Tension 
Illegal Fireworks 1,663 0.53 Social Tension 
Illegal Posters 321 0.10 Social Tension 
 
    
Table 2: Pooled Descriptive Statistics 
            
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
            
Dependent Variables      
All Stops 356 30.15 34.37 0 275 
Black Stops 356 24.90 29.17 0 244 
Hispanic/Latinx Stops 356 1.862 5.078 0 48 
White Stops 356 2.522 5.605 0 43 
Independent Variables      
Racial Diversity 356 0.374 0.215 0 0.715 
Interactions      
Racial Diversity x Over 
70% Black in 2011 356 0.096 0.169 0 0.698 
Racial Diversity x Over 
70% White in 2011 356 0.078 0.163 0 0.604 
Racial Diversity x No 
Racial Majority in 2011 356 0.194 0.272 0 0.715 
Control Variables      
Business 356 88.86 96.92 3 938 
Total Population 356 3,519 1,351 1,043 7,923 
Population Density 356 16,597 11,654 745.5 67,155 
Metro Ridership 356 7,184 16,888 0 107,665 
311 Calls 355 282.8 376.2 1 2,908 
Over 70% Black in 2011 356 0.225 -- 0 1 
Over 70% White in 2011 356 0.101 -- 0 1 
No Racial Majority in 2011 356 0.677 -- 0 1 







Table 3. Spatial Lag Models – Marginal Effects 
    
Variables Both Lags Racial Diversity Lag Residual Lag 
    
Racial Diversity 0.251*** 0.249** 0.271*** 
 (0.0869) (0.0936) (0.0838) 
Racial Diversity Lag -0.336 -0.348 -- 
 (0.255) (0.283)  
Business 0.0815** 0.0837* 0.0812** 
 (0.0395) (0.0406) (0.0384) 
Population Density -0.00260*** -0.003*** -0.00253*** 
 (0.000512) (0.0005) (0.000490) 
Metro Riders 0.000808+ 0.00128** 0.000718 
 (0.000464) (0.0005) (0.000476) 
Age 18 to 24 -0.0242 -0.0625 -0.0116 
 (0.124) (0.127) (0.121) 
Unemployment -0.203 -0.196 -0.183 
 (0.238) (0.259) (0.238) 
Index Crime 0.0432+ 0.0556* 0.0407 
 (0.0259) (0.0281) (0.0257) 
Residual Lag -0.501*** -- -0.500*** 
 (0.117)  (0.118) 
    
Observations 356 356 356 
Standard errors in parentheses 















Table 4. Black Stops, White Stops, and Hispanic/Latinx Stops – Marginal Effects 
    
Variables All Stops Black Stops White Stops 
    
Racial Diversity 0.271*** 0.574*** -0.0718 
 (0.0838) (0.159) (0.0461) 
Business 0.0812** 0.189*** -0.00361 
 (0.0384) (0.0709) (0.0102) 
Population Density -0.00253*** -0.00295*** -0.000226 
 (0.000490) (0.000852) (0.000159) 
Metro Riders 0.000718 -0.000113 0.000202+ 
 (0.000476) (0.00174) (0.000107) 
Age 18 to 24 -0.0116 0.0828 -0.0164 
 (0.121) (0.253) (0.0202) 
Unemployment -0.183 0.161 -0.0643 
 (0.238) (0.317) (0.0896) 
Index Crime 0.0407 0.0655 -0.00556 
 (0.0257) (0.0423) (0.00770) 
Residual Lag -0.500*** -0.306*** -0.189 
 (0.118) (0.105) (0.209) 
    
Observations 356 356 356 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, + p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Hispanic/Latinx Stops Overall and by 
Neighborhood Type 
        
Neighborhood Type N Mean Median St. Dev Min Max  
Over 70% White in 2011 35       
      2011 Stops  0.657 0 1.392 0 6  
      Change in Stops  0.686 0 2.083 -3 8  
Over 70% Black in 2011 80       
     2011 Stops  0.538 0 2.099 0 15  
     Change in Stops  0.913 0 3.859 -6 29  
No Racial Majority in 2011 63       
     2011 Stops  1.476 0 2.583 0 13  
     Change in Stops  3.936 1 8.09 -3 40  
Total 178       
     2011 Stops  0.894 0 2.205 0 15  








Table 6. Baseline Racial Composition Models – Marginal Effects 
    
Variables All Stops Black Stops White Stops 
    
Racial Diversity 0.0711 0.242 -0.0437 
 (0.155) (0.317) (0.0411) 
RD x Over 70% White 0.917** -1.370** 0.0734 
 (0.409) (0.553) (0.0706) 
RD x Over 70% Black 0.233 0.743** -0.123 
 (0.199) (0.360) (0.0798) 
Business 0.0617 0.208*** -0.00545 
 (0.0423) (0.0646) (0.00923) 
Population Density -0.00266*** -0.00258*** -0.000262+ 
 (0.000502) (0.000608) (0.000155) 
Metro Riders 0.000791+ -0.000218 0.000210 
 (0.000430) (0.00127) (0.000130) 
Age 18 to 24 0.00525 0.156 -0.0172 
 (0.119) (0.239) (0.0191) 
Unemployment -0.234 0.195 -0.121 
 (0.230) (0.277) (0.105) 
Index Crime 0.0510** 0.0467 -0.00318 
 (0.0259) (0.0382) (0.00755) 
Residual Lag -0.471*** -0.454*** -0.264 
 (0.124) (0.109) (0.239) 
    
Observations 356 356 356 
Standard errors in parentheses 











Table 7. Calls to 311 Mediation Analysis – Marginal Effects 
    
Variables All Stops Black Stops White Stops 
    
Racial Diversity (RD) 0.0810 0.203 -0.0509 
 (0.153) (0.335) (0.0407) 
RD x Over 70% White 0.901** -1.298** 0.0615 
 (0.406) (0.623) (0.0772) 
RD x Over 70% Black 0.194 0.702+ -0.122 
 (0.201) (0.391) (0.0793) 
Calls to 311 0.00333 0.0143** -0.00145 
 (0.00564) (0.00616) (0.00162) 
Business 0.0558 0.135+ -0.00332 
 (0.0497) (0.0755) (0.00940) 
Population Density -0.00284*** -0.00298*** -0.000363*** 
 (0.000541) (0.000735) (0.000137) 
Metro Ridership 0.000977+ 0.000174 0.000227+ 
 (0.000506) (0.00150) (0.000132) 
Age 18 to 24 0.00208 0.0978 -0.0191 
 (0.121) (0.252) (0.0213) 
Unemployment -0.263 0.169 -0.122 
 (0.268) (0.303) (0.0911) 
Index Crime 0.0364 0.0278 0.000535 
 (0.0272) (0.0420) (0.00727) 
Residual Lag 0.422*** -0.00815 0.0131 
 (0.134) (0.147) (0.270) 
    
Observations 356 356 356 
Standard errors in parentheses 
































Metro  Unemp. Crime Residual 
Lag 
Stops 1.00         
Racial 
Diversity 
0.062 1.00        
311 Calls 0.45 0.25 1.00       
Business 0.47 0.24 0.48 1.00      
Pop. 
Density 
0.04 0.32 0.20 0.07 1.00     
Metro 0.09 0.21 0.11 0.61 0.01 1.00    
Age 18 
to 24 
-0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.09 -0.05 0.10    
Unemp. -0.08 -0.56 -0.22 -0.28 -0.22 -0.19 1.00   
Crime 0.65 0.14 0.39 0.78 0.09 0.47 -0.06 1.00  
Residual 
Lag 











































































Figure 3. Predictive Margins – All Stops 
 
 





































Call type Frequency Percent Classification 
Bulk Collection 45990 14.67 Basic services 
Parking Meter Repair 36050 11.50 Basic services 
Parking Enforcement 35607 11.36 Social tension 
Emergency No-Parking Verification (2016 
only) 12644 4.03 Social tension 
Sign New Investigation 12380 3.95 Social tension 
Pothole 11301 3.60 Physical repair 
Trash Collection - Missed (2016 only) 8159 2.60 Basic services 
Alley Cleaning 7380 2.35 Social tension 
Residential Parking Permit Violation 7122 2.27 Social tension 
Sanitation Enforcement 6655 2.12 Social tension 
Snow/Ice Removal 6175 1.97 Basic services 
Sidewalk Repair 5816 1.85 Physical repair 
Sidewalk Shoveling Enforcement Exemption 
(2016 only) 5777 1.84 Basic services 
Illegal Dumping 5563 1.77 Social tension 
Street Cleaning 5453 1.74 Social tension 
xxx_Wires Down LOOK UP ONLY 5432 1.73 Administrative 
Residential Snow Removal (ServeDC) (2016 
only) 5336 1.70 Basic services 
xxx_Abandoned House LOOK UP ONLY 4973 1.59 Administrative 
Abandoned Vehicle - On Public Property 4953 1.58 Social tension 
Tree Pruning 4084 1.30 Physical repair 
DMV - Drivers License/ID Issues (2016 only) 3993 1.27 Basic services 
Tree Inspection 3889 1.24 Physical repair 
Rodent Inspection and Treatment (2016 only) 3531 1.13 Physical repair 
Out of State Parking Violation (ROSA) 3043 0.97 Social tension 
Snow/Ice Removal (Roadways AND Bridge 
walkways ONLY) (2016 only) 2858 0.91 Basic services 
Tree Planting 2692 0.86 Physical repair 
Dead Animal Collection (2016 only) 2654 0.85 Basic services 
DMV - Vehicle Registration Issues (2016 
only) 2600 0.83 Basic services 
TRU Report 2536 0.81 Social tension 
Tree Removal 2433 0.78 Physical repair 
Sign Replacement 2356 0.75 Basic services 
Traffic Signal Maintanence (2016 only) 2141 0.68 Basic services 
Alleylight Repair (2016 only) 2134 0.68 Physical repair 





Illegal Fireworks 1663 0.53 Social tension 
Yard Waste - Missed (2016 only) 1639 0.52 Basic services 
DC Government Information (2016 only) 1583 0.50 Unknown 
Abandoned Vehicle - On Private Property 1528 0.49 Social tension 
Trash Cart - Delivery (2016 only) 1498 0.48 Basic services 
Alley Repair 1427 0.46 Physical repair 
Container Removal (2016 only) 1373 0.44 Physical repair 
Grass and Weeds Mowing 1415 0.45 Physical repair 
Supercan - Delivery (2016 only) 1226 0.39 Basic services 
Streetlight Repair Investigation 1184 0.38 Physical repair 
Snow Removal Complaints for Sidewalks 
(2016 only) 1109 0.35 Basic services 
Abandoned Bicycle (2016 only) 1046 0.33 Social tension 
How's My Driving – Complaint 1,342 0.43 Social tension 
Curb and Gutter Repair 881 0.28 Physical repair 
Roadway Signs (2016 only) 865 0.28 Physical repair 
Rat Abatement 833 0.27 Physical repair 
FEMS - Community Events (2016 only) 825 0.26 Basic services 
Traffic Signal Issue (2016 only) 799 0.25 Basic services 
Vacant Lot 778 0.25 Mixed 
DMV - Copy of Ticket (2016 only) 752 0.24 Basic services 
DDOT Citation (2011 only) 719 0.23 Social tension 
DMV - Vehicle Title Issues (2016 only) 594 0.19 Basic services 
Sign Missing Investigation 537 0.17 Basic services 
Leaf Season Collection (2016 only) 475 0.15 Basic services 
Traffic Calming (2016 only) 469 0.15 Social tension 
DMV - Forms, Applications, and Manuals 
Request (2016 only) 459 0.15 Basic services 
Public Space Litter Can- 
Installation/Removal/Repair (2016 only) 446 0.14 Basic services 
Public Space Litter Can-Collection (2016 only) 425 0.14 Basic services 
Wire Down / Power Outage 507 0.16 Basic services 
Sign Removal investigation (2016 only) 427 0.14 Basic services 
DOEE - General Environmental Concerns 
(2016 only) 406 0.13 Physical repair 
Roadway Repair (2016 only) 382 0.12 Physical repair 
Traffic Calming Investigation (2011 only) 352 0.11 Mixed 
Alleylight Repair Investigation 341 0.11 Physical repair 
Trash Cart Repair (2016 only) 339 0.11 Basic services 
DMV - Hearings (2016 only) 333 0.11 Basic services 
DCRA - Trash and Debris (2011 only) 325 0.10 Social tension 
DOEE - Construction – Erosion Runoff (2016 





DMV - Online Processing Issues (2016 only) 301 0.10 Basic services 
CSR Reported Issues (2011 only) 291 0.09 Mixed 
FEMS - Smoke Alarm Application (2016 only) 291 0.09 Basic services 
Bus/Rail Issues (2016 only) 276 0.09 Physical repair 
Christmas Tree Removal-Seasonal (2016 only) 258 0.08 Physical repair 
Marking Installation 391 0.12 Physical repair 
DMV - Refunds - Tickets (2016 only) 252 0.08 Basic services 
Emergency - Heating and Cooling 250 0.08 Basic services 
Resident Parking Permit (2016 only) 241 0.08 Social tension 
Traffic Safety Investigation (2016 only) 233 0.07 Social tension 
Signed Street Sweeping Missed (2016 only) 224 0.07 Basic services 
DMV - Vehicle Insurance Lapse (2016 only) 187 0.06 Basic services 
Emergency - Trees 172 0.05 Basic Services 
Illegal Poster 321 0.10 Social tension 
Insects 261 0.08 Basic services 
DOEE - Nuisance Odor Complaints (2016 
only) 158 0.05 Social tension 
Recycling Cart - Repair (2016 only) 154 0.05 Basic services 
Signs Conflicting (2016 only) 150 0.05 Basic services 
Utility Repair Issue (2016 only) 137 0.04 Physical repair 
DMV - Processing Center Manager (2016 
only) 114 0.04 Basic services 
Snow Metro Bus Shelter/Stop (2016 only) 114 0.04 Basic services 
DMV - Ticket Payment Dispute (2016 only) 99 0.03 Basic services 
Roadway Marking Maintenance 102 0.03 Physical repair 
DMV - Adjudication Supervisor (2016 only) 93 0.03 Basic services 
Snow Towing (2016 only) 90 0.03 Basic services 
xxx_Building Code Violation LOOK UP 
ONLY (2011 only) 
88 0.03 Administrative 
DMV - Driver Record Issues (2016 only) 84 0.03 Basic services 
DMV - Driver and Vehicle Services Refund 
(2016 only) 77 0.02 Basic services 
Curb and Gutter Repair Investigation (2016 
only) 75 0.02 Physical repair 
Safe Routes to School (2016 only) 73 0.02 Basic services 
Pedestrian Safety Program (2011 only) 64 0.02 Mixed 
DMV - Drivers License/ID Reinstatement 
(2016 only) 57 0.02 Basic services 
DOEE - Engine Idling Tips (2016 only) 55 0.02 Social tension 
DMV - eTIMS Ticket Alert Services Issues 
(2016 only) 51 0.02 Basic services 
DMV - Appeal (2016 only) 47 0.01 Basic services 





How Is My Driving - Compliment 76 0.02 Social tension 
Snow Ticket Reimbursement (2016 only) 37 0.01 Basic services 
Bicycle Services (2016 only) 34 0.01 Basic services 
Homeless Services - Winter/Hypothermia 
Season (2016 only) 32 0.01 Basic services 
Recycling- Information Request (2016 only) 31 0.01 Basic services 
DMV - Offset Tracking (2016 only) 29 0.01 Basic services 
Roadway Marking Modification 28 0.01 Physical repair 
DOEE - Ban on Foam Food Containers (2016 
only) 26 0.01 Social tension 
Emergency - Power Outage/Wires Down (2016 
only) 25 0.01 Basic services 
DMV - Vehicle Inspection Issues (2016 only) 25 0.01 Basic services 
School Crossing Guard (2016 only) 22 0.01 Basic services 
Street Paving Schedule (2011 only) 21 0.01 Physical repair 
Litter Can - Installation/Removal/Repair (2011 
only) 
20 0.01 Basic services 
Light-Tunnel/Underpass Light Repair (2016 
only) 19 0.01 Physical repair 
Emergency - Power Outage / Wires Down 
(2011 only) 
18 0.01 Basic services 
OUC NYE Test (2016 only) 17 0.01 Administrative 
Emergency - Supplies 16 0.01 Basic Services 
Bed Bugs (2011 only) 15 0.00 Basic services 
Light-Overhead Guide Sign Lighting Repair 14 0.00 Physical repair 
Marking Removal (2016 only) 18 0.01 Physical repair 
Recycling - Information Request (2011 only) 11 0.00 Basic services 
Hypothermia Shelter Information (2016 only) 11 0.00 Basic services 
Snow Other 10 0.00 Basic services 
Child Safety Seat Program (2016 only) 10 0.00 Basic services 
Trash Collection - Missed Customer Follow-up 
(2011 only) 
9 0.00 Basic services 
xxx_Housing Inspection LOOK UP ONLY 
(2011 only) 
9 0.00 Administrative 
Yard Waste - Missed - Customer Follow-up 
(2011 only) 
9 0.00 Basic services 
DCRA - Vacant Building (2011 only) 8 0.00 Social tension 
Recycling Collection - Missed - Customer 
Follow-up (2011 only) 
8 0.00 Basic services 
Recycling - Commercial Only 8 0.00 Basic services 
Streetcar (2016 only) 7 0.00 Unknown 
Supercan - Repair 6 0.00 Basic services 





Sanitation Enforcement - Customer Follow-up 
(2011 only) 
5 0.00 Social tension 
Utility Repair Investigation 5 0.00 Physical repair 
Bicycle Issues 5 0.00 Physical repair 
Recycling Cart Delivery 4 0.00 Basic services 
xxx_Public Space - Defects (Under 
Investigation) LOOK UP ONL (2011 only) 
3 0.00 Administrative 
Recycling - School Program (2016 only) 3 0.00 Basic services 
Emergency - Senior Assistance (2016 only) 3 0.00 Basic services 
Bulk Collection – Unscheduled (2011 only) 2 0.00 Social tension 
Graffiti Removal - Paint Voucher Customer 
Follow-up 
2 0.00 Social tension 
xxx_Parking - Handicapped LOOK UP ONLY 2 0.00 Administrative 
DPW Correspondence Tracking (2016 only) 2 0.00 Unknown 
Report Invalid Address to GIS Dept (2016 
only) 2 0.00 Administrative 
Emergency - Flooding (2016 only) 2 0.00 Basic services 
Bus Shelters 1 0.00 Physical repair 
Eviction 1 0.00 Social tension 
Graffiti Removal (2011 only) 1 0.00 Social tension 
Leaf Collection 1 0.00 Basic services 
Recycling Collection - Missed 1 0.00 Basic services 
School Crossing Guard Program 1 0.00 Basic services 
Supercan - Repair - Customer Follow-up 1 0.00 Basic services 
Traffic Camera Location Map 1 0.00 Basic services 
xxx_DHS MISC LOOK UP ONLY 1 0.00 Administrative 
xxx_DPW MISC LOOK UP ONLY 1 0.00 Administrative 
xxx_XXX Vacant Property LOOK UP ONLY 
(2011 only) 
1 0.00 Administrative 
School Transit Subsidy Program (2016 only) 1 0.00 Basic services 
SalesForce DC311 Application Request (2016 
only) 1 0.00 Unknown 
Light-Light Pole (2016 only) 1 0.00 Physical repair 
Ticket Ombudsman (2016 only) 1 0.00 Unknown 
DDS - Serious Medication Error (2016 only) 1 0.00 Basic services 
FEMS - Fire Safety Education (2016 only) 1 0.00 Basic services 
DOEE - Foam Ban Tips (2016 only) 1 0.00 Social tension 
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